

For

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Cutting from the

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THE FRIEND

II.

When Lord Melgund was campaigning with a glittering host on the north-west frontier of India, with his gay youth behind him and a world of adventure and power lying in front, a poor working lad of 26 winters won, by his own extraordinary merit and perseverance, an honour

summer's night, however, out under the stars he and a comrade, deeply moved by their own enthusiasm and aspiration, made a compact that poor though they were they would, with God's help, win for themselves a university degree. "We were both poor. He was a pupil teacher. He could name the parts of speech, and I could



GILBERT JOHN, 4TH EARL OF ... K.G., P.C., G.O.S.I., ETC.
(From a sketch by P. A. Laszlo, 1912)

degree in the University of Glasgow. His name was Jones, and he was the son of a village shoemaker in Denbighshire, a Calvinistic Methodist. At the age of 12 years he left school and joined his father in the little workshop from 8 a.m. to 8-p.m. and there he toiled for four years. One

not." So they gathered themselves together, dedicated themselves to the highest things, and set to work forthwith to bend themselves to this exalted and rather desperate task. They kept their compact. The one became Canon Redfern, Rector of Denbigh, the other Sir Henry Jones, Professor of

to admit a measure of freedom also to the will. For both involve the power which constitute the "main miracle" of selfhood, the power of reviewing and revising our experiences. In the one case we reshape old beliefs and ways of thinking in the light of newly apprehended truth; in the other we reshape old purposes and ways of acting in the light of newly apprehended good. We have simply to accept this power of self-review and self-revision as unescapably the central fact of our nature. In this lies the essence of moral responsibility.

Moral Disease and Sin.

But recent psychology has done undoubted service in bringing out more clearly the limitations of moral responsibility; the fact, that is, that there is such a thing as *moral disease* and that moral disease is not the same as sin. The old doctrine of demonic possession afforded a similar escape from the necessity of holding a man morally accountable for all his actions. We now realise in a more rational way that many persons are the victims of uncontrollable impulses to which their past voluntary acts and

And to grant this much freedom of thought is to admit a measure of freedom also to the will. For both involve the power which constitute the "main miracle" of selfhood, the power of reviewing and revising our experiences. In the one case we reshape old beliefs and ways of thinking in the light of newly apprehended truth; in the other we reshape old purposes and ways of acting in the light of newly apprehended good. We have simply to accept this power of self-review and self-revision as unescapably the central fact of our nature. In this lies the essence of moral responsibility.

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